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FEMINISM mE, m S E  N"F 
t philosophers do not take well to criticism, and while many schol- 
ars are appalled at the idea of an academic field adhering to a controversial 
political philosophy and g a mntroversial agenda within the acad- 
emy, very few have been to take on the daunting and unrewarding 
job of examining and criticizing tlne feminists' arguments and assumptiom. 
In consequence, a fernini~t pMosolphy that is inspiring the successful effort 
to transform the Arnerican academy goes on virtually unchallenged. In this 
be discussing some serious moral and pedagogic weak- 
philosophy, My ktentions are to initiate discussion on 
some important and controversial topics. The hope is that others will enter 
the fray and that a more open and less diffident debate will ensue. 
I. Q u i q  Femihm and Gender Ft:~.nism 
Every day the public is witnm to f e n W t  ouuage at how badly women are 
treated: in the worQlaw, in the tmurts, on dates, in marriages, in the pri- 
maw schools-by men inostly, but sometimes by other women. Much of 
what is reported is h d w d  true, and some of it is very dkturbing and pro- 
vocative. Of course, the abuse of women must be made h o r n  and must 
arouse indignation. Phto B h e K  r m  the role of righteous indipa- 
" The &st four essays published here were origioalb presented at a December 1992 
meeting of the Arnerican ion for the Philosophic Study of Society in Wash 
D.C, c h a i  by Fred D. r., Profiessc~r of Philosophy and EKecutive Director, 
PMilosophy and Policy Center, B w h g  Glen State Blniveaity. 
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tion as a mainspring of moral action. In his metaphor, indignation is the 
good steed helping the charioteer to stay on the path of virtue by helping 
him to control the vicious, wayward steed straining to go its own brutish 
way. It is the "spirited" element in the soul that supplies the wise man 
with the emotional energy-the horse power-to curb the appetites so that 
he may act virtuously. 
Certainly, feminist indignation at injustices to women is a motive 
force behind all of our efforts to right the wrongs women suffer. However, 
many of the umbrageous feminists who are publicly explaining the plight of 
women in America are moved by more dubious passions and interests. 
There is a feminism of resentment, one that goes quite beyond the moral 
passion for setting matters right. The feminists I have in mind are guided 
by a feminist philosophy that rationalizes, justifies, and fosters in women a 
wholesale rancor. It has little to do with moral indignation. 
Resentment may begin in and include indignation, but it is by far the 
more abiding passion. Resentment is "harbored" or "nurtured"; it "takes 
root" in a subject (the victim) and remains directed at another (the, cul- 
prit). It can be "vicarious." You need not have harmed me personally, but 
if I identifl with someone you have harmed, I may resent you. Such resent- 
ment is very common, and it may easily be as strong and intense as resent- 
ment occasioned by direct injury. In a way it is stronger, for, by enlarging 
the class of victims to include myself and others, villainy has been magni- 
fied. 
Having demarcated a victimized "'Us" with whom I now feel soli- 
darity, I have begun to think in terms of a victimized group. Pointing to 
one victim, I say to myself, "In wronging her he has betrayed his contempt 
for us all and wronged us as well," or, "Anyone who harms a woman 
harms us all," or simply, "What he did to her, he did to all of us." 
Once one has thus generalized a victim class, it is quite common to 
take the next generalizing step by regarding the individual who wronged Us 
as himself representative of a group. Now resentment enlarges the focus of 
its animus to all the members of that group. This I may do quite "reason- 
ably" by adopting a position from which people like the perpetrator (male, 
rich, etc.) are regarded as "the kind of people" that exploit people like 
"us." My social reality has now been dichotomized into two groups politi- 
cally at odds, one dominating and exploiting the other. 
Once I get into the habit of regarding women as a subjugated gender, 
I am primed to be alarmed, angry, resentful of men as oppressors of 
women. I am also prepared to believe the worst about them and the harm 
they cause to women. In all cases of this kind, animosity to a group is 
justified and made to seem reasonable by an analysis and social philosophy 
that promotes a picture of a bifurcated hierarchical society in which inimi- 
cal forces represented by a group exploit and oppress the weak and the 
innocent. Those who promote this provocative analysis never think of 
FEMINISM AND RESENTMENT 3 
themselves as doing anything wrong. It is inevitable that anger and resent- 
ment is kindled against a whole group; it is inevitable that, in kindling pub- 
lic anger, falsehoods will sometimes be told. But these things cannot be 
helped. after all that group is the source of the oppression or pollution, 
and its power must be broken. Behind the popular books advertising the 
motifs of humiliation, subordination, and male backlash (e.g., Faludi's Back- 
lash, Wolfs The Beauty Myth, Marilyn French's The War against Women )> 
there are the feminist philosophers who promote the doctrine of a bifurca- 
ted society in which women are trapped in a structure variously referred to 
as "capitalist patriarchy," "hetero-patriarchy," or the "sedgender system."z 
According to Sandra Harding, it is "a system of maledominance made pos- 
sible by men's control of women's productive and reproductive labor.'s 
Borrowing from Gayle Rubin, Sandra Lee Bartky talks of the sedgender 
system as "that complex process whereby bisexual infants are transformed 
into male and female gender personalities, the one destined to command, 
the other destined to obey."4 Virginia Bleld reports on the feminist convic- 
tion that feminist philosophers are the initiators of an intellectual revolu- 
tion comparable to those of "Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud." Indeed, as 
Held points out, "some feminists think this latest revolution will be even 
more profound." According to Held, the "sedgender system" is the control- 
ling insight of this feminist revolution; she speaks of it as "intellectually 
gripping" and tells us of the impact the discovery of the sedgender system 
has had on feminist theory: "Now that the sedgender system has become 
visible to us, we can see it everywhere? 
Perhaps most feminist philosophers are "sex/gender feminists"; most 
do "see it everywhere." I sometimes envy Held and her sister gender femi- 
nists for the thrill they get from seeing the world through the lenses of 
sexual politics. Nevertheless, the sexlgender perspective on social reality 
constitutes the philosophical ground for a grim feminism of resentment and 
the ascription of collective guilt. For it promotes the doctrine of an imper- 
sonal but implacable male conspiracy built into the power relations that 
prevail in a culture deemed inimically androcentric. 
Resentment is not a wholesome passion. Unlike indignation, it is not 
an ethical passion. But, because it often originates in moral outrage at real 
injustice (from wife battering to s e t  job discrimination), resentment can 
be made to sound very much like a justifjiable and even commendable pas- 
sion for social justice. 
Once a feminist has got the two genders in place in a system of 
oppression, her critical faculties are weakened, making it easy to believe ill 
of male-kind--and her hyper-readiness to be affronted is in place as well. 
Any little incident can then trigger rage, shock, and resentment. Reading 
feminist literature one finds a genre of writing in which the narrator 
reports on how she personally was the victim of some male outrage, often 
perpetrated by someone who may have been quite unaware of the distress 
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he caused. 
The feminist theorist Kathryn Allen Rabuzzi opens her book Mother- 
self by telling us that she suffered while taking a walk on New York's 
Second Avenue.6 It happened when a bum asking for a handout said, 
"Mama can you spare some change": 
[NJever till that moment had I seen myself as "Mama" in such 
an impersonal, external context. In the man's speaking I beheld 
myself anew. "I" disappeared, as though turned inside out, and 
"Mama" took my place. 
Ms. hbuzzi reports on a "shocking dislocation of Self." Her reaction illus- 
trates how a dichotomized view of social reality keeps many a feminist per- 
manently on edge, ready to cringe at the slightest provocation. 
Here is Sandra Bartky telling us how she was "dislocated" while tak- 
ing a walk 
It is a fine spring day, and with an utter lack of selfconscious- 
ness, I am bouncing down the street. Suddenly . . . [clatcalls and 
whistles fill the air. Those noises are clearly sexual in intent and 
they are meant for me. . . . I freeze. As Sartre would say, I have 
been petrified by the gaze of the Other. . . . I have been made 
into an object. . . . Blissfully unaware, breasts bouncing, eyes on 
the birds in the trees, I could have passed by without being 
turned into stone. . . . What I describe seems less the spontane- 
ous expression of a healthy eroticism than a ritual of subjuga- 
tion? 
In that last remark about "subjugation," Professor Bartky is taking pains to 
get the scarifying catcalls into proper focus: Bartky's personal discomfiture 
must be understood in political terms. It's what's happening to all of Us all 
the time-in the maledominated culture. 
In an article called "The Feminist Revelation," I suggested that the 
new feminism has many of the elements of a religion or religious cult? If 
so, the public testimony of its adherents has a special character. We are 
accustomed to hearing the testimony and confessions of sinners. But in the 
feminist case, the devotee testifies in public on how she has been sinned 
against. 
Ms. Bartky gets her wounds when she passes construction sites. Mari- 
lyn French, the author of The War against Women, finds herself vulnerable 
in museums where she is mugged by works of art created by men: 
Artists appropriate the female body as their subject, their pos- 
session . . . assaulting female reality and autonomy. . . . Visiting 
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galleries and museums (especially the Pompidou Center in 
Paris) I feel assaulted by twentieth century abstract sculpture 
that resembles exaggerated female body parts, mainly breasbs.9 
Not all of the women who believe they are in a gender war against 
men, are defiantly resentful. Some are demoralized by the feeling. This is 
well illustrated by Carole Sheffield's article "Sexual Terrorism" in a recent 
anthology on feminist philosophy.10 I excerpt it at some length, to show 
how the perspective of being trapped in a "rape culture" can lead one from 
angry defiance and resentment to a more permanent and crippling state of 
fearfulness. Unfortunately, Ms. Sheffield's reaction is common to many a 
teacher of feminist theory, and her mood of siege and terror is being con- 
veyed to more and more students: 
The word terrorism invokes images of furtive organizations ... 
whose members blow up buildings and cars. . . . But there is a 
different kind of terrorism. . . . Its targets are females--of all 
ages, races, and classes. . . . I call it sexual terrorism because it 
is a system by which males frighten and, by frightening, control 
and dominate females. 
Ms. Sheffield describes an "ordinary" event that took place one early eve- 
ning. She was alone in a laundromat and suddenly felt very vulnerable: 
[Tjhe laundromat was brightly lit; and my car was the only one 
in the lot. Anyone passing by could readily see that I was alone 
and isolated. Knowing that rape is a crime of opportunity, I 
became terrified. 
Ms. Sheffield left her laundry in the washer and dashed back to her a?., 
sitting in it with the doors locked and the windows up. 
When the wash was completed, 1 dashed in, threw the clothes 
into the drier, and ran back out to my car. When the clothes 
were dry, I tossed them recklessly into the basket and humedly 
drove away to fold them in the security of my home. Although I 
was not victimized in a direct, physical way by objective or mea- 
surable standards, I felt victimized. It was, for me, a terrifying 
experience. 
At home, her terror subsided and turned to anger: 
Mostly I was angry at being unfree: a hostage of a culture that, 
for the most part, encourages violence against females, instructs 
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men in the methodology of sexual violence, and provides them 
with ready justification for their violence. . . . Following my 
experience at the laundromat, I talked with my students about 
terrorization.11 
Whether one reacts with terror to the feeling of being a hostage in 
the male culture is partly a matter of individual temperament. Among most 
gender feminists, a defiant resentment is perhaps more the norm. 
Students in the "feminist classrooms" who are taught to regard the 
society they inhabit as a patriarchal system of oppression are deeply affec- 
ted by this perspective. I have talked with quite a few women students who 
spoke to me of their feelings. Some are frightened, others are angry. But 
for most, the world had become grimmer than before. 
According to Laurie Martinka, a Women's Studies graduate fiom Vas- 
sar, "You're never the same again. Sometimes I even bemoan the fact that 
so much has changed. I am tired of always ripping things apart because 
they exclude the perspective of women. . . . You become so aware of 
things. And it is hard. My mother cannot accept it. It is hard for her 
because I have changed so completely." 
Anne Package, a student at the University of Pennsylvania, told me 
how students talk among themselves about this keen new awareness: "We 
call it 'being on the verge' or 'bottoming out.' You are down on everything. 
Nothing is funny anymore. It hits you like a ton of bricks. You hit rock 
bottom and ask: How can I live my life?" 
The expression intrigued me. On the verge. Of what? But there is no 
mystery here. Women on the verge do not hesitate to tell you that they are 
barely containing their wrath at how women have been intimidated and put 
down. And every so often they vent it. 
When I suggested to Ms. Package that she and her classmates are 
regarded as among the world's more fortunate young women, she bristled. 
"We still suffer psychological oppression. If you feel like the whole world is 
on top of you then it is." 
There is a substantial literature on the "verge" reaction and how to 
help women to channel it properly. Professor Carolyn Shrewbury of Ma- 
kanto State University, Minnesota, suggests that feminist teachers can 
"empower" their students by talking about the verge feeling in a way that 
"recognizes their right to understand what they are undergoing." This vali- 
dates their perspective on social reality and makes them feel not only nor- 
mal but exceptionally insightful. The feeling of being on the verge is not 
treated as a transitory student stage, but as a permanent condition reached 
by women who have achieved a realistic awareness of their plight in the 
male-dominated society. 
Contemporary resenters claim continuity with the Likes of the eigh- 
teenth-sentury fexninist Mary Wollstonecraft or later feminists like the 
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Grimke sisters, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan Anthony, and Harriet Tay- 
lor. But those giants of the women's movement nursed no personal griev- 
ances. Speaking of the women who participated in the Seneca Falls conven- 
tion of 1848, Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote: "They had not in their own 
experience endured the coarser forms of tyranny resulting from unjust laws, 
or association with immoral and unsmpulous men, but they had souls 
large enough to feel the wrongs of others without being scarified in their 
own flesh."lZ 
One of the main differences between the humanistic, Enlightenment 
feminists of yesteryear and today's sedgender feminists is the degree of self- 
preoccupation . Elizabeth Stanton and Susan Anthony were otherdirected in 
their focus; they were keenly aware that they themselves were privileged, 
middle-class, protected women; they knew in their bones how utterly in- 
appropriate it would be to compare themselves with the vulnerable women 
of their day, and it never occurred to them to talk of their own personal 
grievances before the public. 
The founders of the women's movement were inspired by Enlighten- 
ment principles of individual justice to wage their fight for women's rights, 
the very principles that the founders of America's political order had 
appealed to. Stanton had her consciousness raised by reading John Locke 
and Thomas Jefferson. Her reliance on the Declaration of Independence 
(adding only that women as well as men enjoyed the rights it proclaimed) 
was a direct expression of her sincerely held creed and the creed of the 
men and women assembled at Seneca Falls. Stanton and the other founding 
mothers of American feminism demanded that recognized constitutional 
principles be applied to women as well as to men. 
By contrast, the radical demand to dismantle Patriarchy calls for a 
social revolution. The sexual politics of gender feminism is essentially uto- 
pian; its political goals cannot be achieved by amending the Constitution. 
The contemporary reenters have lost faith in the classically liberal Enlight- 
enment principles. Again, where the classical feminist agenda was designed 
to work within the system, calling for constitutional reforms and other such 
measures, the new feminism is radical in calling for a new social order. 
It is now a commonplace that feminist theory must move away from 
liberalism and individualism. According to Alison Jaggar, "radical and 
socialist feminists have shown that old ideals of freedom, equality and 
democracy are insufficient."l3 Iris Young points out that "after two cen- 
turies of faith . . . the ideal of equality and fraternity" no longer prevails.14 
Andrea Nye acknowledges that the liberal agenda has been successful in 
gaining women legal freedoms, but she insists that this means very little, 
since "the liberated enfranchised woman might complain that democratic 
society has only returned her to a more profound subordination."*s 
I want to linger just a bit over Jaggar's anti-liberal animadversions. 
Jaggar is, after all, a doyenne of contemporary feminist philosophy. (But I 
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confess, she interests me personally because she has taken a special interest 
in me.) 
Like all gender feminists, Jaggar distrusts the aspirations and values 
of women who have been socialized under patriarchy. She is critical of the 
liberal notion of "autonomy": 
Central to the concept of autonomy is the idea of selfdeiini- 
tion, a reliance on the authority of individual judgment. If in- 
dividual desires and interests are socially constructed, however, 
the ultimate authority of individual judgment comes into ques- 
tion. Perhaps people may be mistaken about truth, morality and 
even their own interests: perhaps they may be systematically 
self-deceived or mislead by their society.16 
However, her theory of false consciousness does leave room for exceptional 
women who are able to transcend their socialization: "[Clertain historical 
circumstances allow specific groups of women to transcend at least partially 
the perceptions and theoretical constructs of male dominance. . . ." It is 
these women of raised consciousness who "inspire and guide women in a 
struggle for social change."l7 
Jaggar is a clear writer who makes no bones about saying that most 
women-including seemingly free and enlightened American women--are 
wrongly socialized, and confused, and that their values and aspirations and 
choices may therefore be mistaken. But of course she is not atypical. One 
sees many a feminist philosopher caught in the loop of exclaiming, over 
and over again, in ever more subtle ways, how women's choices are com- 
plicitous, confused, and manipulated by men intent on holding on to their 
own dominant status. 
My own view (about which I have written at some length) is that this 
whole approach to American women is unacceptably elitist and matrow- 
ing.18 Indeed, in its devaluation of the professed preferences and interests 
of the majority of women, and in its idea that most women may be system- 
atically selfdeluded and in need of inspired guidance and deprogramming, 
the whole approach is profoundly condescending and not a little misogynist. 
The doctrine is morally flawed. What is more, it represents a betrayal of 
classical feminism. 
2 Women's Ways of Knowing 
Impe~ousness to criticism is to be found whenever one encounters a 
closed perspective that chews up and digests all oounter-evidence, transmut- 
ing it into confirming evidence. The fact that most people, including most 
women, do not see the "pervasive and tenacious system of male power" is 
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only taken to show how deeply inculcated it is. The more women reject the 
teachings of this radical feminism, the more it proves them in thrall to the 
androcentric system. Nothing and no one can upset the hypothesis of the 
sexlgender system for those who "see it everywhere.'" 
Susan Sontag, who has been notably absent from the ranks of resent- 
er feminists, understood the totalizing and otiose character of their philos- 
ophy back in 1975. (I am convinced that, even earlier, Ms. Sontag must 
have taken a good course in analytic philosophy and taken to heart some 
elementary cautions.) Here she is answering critics who had accused her of 
not fully appreciating the plight of women (and of not seeing it every- 
where): 
Virtually everything deplorable in human history furnishes 
material for a restatement of the feminist plaint . . . just as 
every story of a life could lead to a reflection on our common 
mortality and the vanity of human wishes. But if the point is to 
have meaning some of the time, it can't be made all the time. 
. . . [IJt is surely not treasonable to think that there are . . . 
other wounds than sexual wounds, other identities than sexual 
identity, other politics than sexual politicsdnd other 'anti- 
human values' than 'misogynist' ones.19 
Ms. Sontag also shows her sound philosophical instincts when she 
speaks disapprovingly of feminist "anti-intellectualism," telling us that she 
has felt the need to "dissociate [herlself from that wing of feminism that 
promotes the rancid and dangerous antithesis between mind . . . and emo- 
tion." Needless to say, feminist philosophers promote that antithesis in the 
manner in which they oppose male to female "ways of knowing." 
Susan Haack and Susan Sontag are liberal feminists who are dis- 
turbed by the gynocentric turn taken by feminist philosophy. There are oth- 
ers. Two years ago I wrote to the British novelist and philosopher Iris Mur- 
doch, asking for her views on some recent trends in Women's Studies. In 
her response she said: 
Men "created culture" because they were free to do so, and 
women were treated as inferior and made to believe they were. 
Now free women must join in the human world of work and 
creation on an equal footing and be everywhere in art, science, 
business, politics etc. . . . However, to lay claim, in this battle, 
to female ethics, female criticism, female knowledge . . . is to 
set up a new female ghetto. (Chauvinist males should be 
delighted by the move. . . .) 'Women's Studies' can mean that 
women are led to read mediocre or peripheral books by women 
rather than the great books of humanity in general. . . . It is a 
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dead end, in danger of simply separating women from the main- 
stream thinking of the human race. Such cults can also waste 
the time of young people who may be reading all the latest 
books on feminism instead of studying the difficult and impor- 
tant things that belong to the culture of humanity. (Her 
emphases.) 
The universal ideal of a culture of humanity is a theme glaringly 
missing from contemporary feminist philosophy. On the contrary, the seff- 
imposed segregation of women is everywhere in evidence. The harmful idea 
of gendered ways of knowing has trickled down to rank-and-file feminists, 
who are hard at work transforming the curriculum in schools all over the 
country. Even science education is not escaping the sweeping gender-femin- 
ist broom. 
Philosophers from Plato to John Dewey have been keenly aware that 
good or bad education is primarily a matter of good or bad philosophy. At 
the present time, too many philosophers have virtually abandoned their his- 
toric function of being watchdogs to education. One result is that, increas- 
ingly, educational philosophy and practice are being influenced by bad fem- 
inist philosophy. It is unfortunate that clearheaded philosophers, whether 
feminist or nonfeminist, have only just begun to join the discussion. 
Elizabeth Minnich traces the tradition of a male cultural elite to a 
"few privileged, males . . . who are usually called The Greeks."m Minnich, 
along with the other "cumculum transformationists," believes that the con- 
ceptions of rationality and intelligence are white male creations. Professor 
Minnich: 
[A]t present . . . not only are students taught "phallocentric" 
and "colonial" notions of reason as the forms of rational 
expression, but the full possible range of expression of human 
intelligence also tends to be forced into a severely shrunken 
notion of intelligence.21 
Note the references to a "colonial" rationality that binds women to a nar- 
row conception of reason. The transformationist feminist critique of the im- 
perial male culture is not confined to impugning the history, art, and litera- 
ture of the past. Logic and rationality are also regarded as "phallocentric." 
It has become common to use scare quotes to advertise the suspicion of a 
"reality" uncovered by male ways of knowing. Thus, the feminist philoso- 
pher Joyce Trebilcot speaks of "the apparatuses of 'truth,' 'knowledge,' 
'science,' " that men use to "project their personalities as reality!m 
The attack on male culture has become an attack on the rational 
standards and methods that have been the hallmark of scientific progress. 
Here, for example, is a characteristic fragment of applied feminist philoso- 
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phy taken from the guidelines of the state-funded New Jersey Project on 
Curricular Transformation (the project has already done considerable 
damage and should long ago have been discredited by philosophers of 
science): "Mind was male, Nature was female, and knowledge was created 
as an act of aggression--a passive nature had to be interrogated, unclothed, 
penetrated and compelled by man to reveal her secrets."23 
That the state of New Jersey sho~lld find itself in the position of 
endorsing controversial conceptions of reality and knowledge is a tribute to 
the energy and influence of the feminist transformationists. The New Jersey 
Project conducts "conferences, workshops and a regional network of meet- 
ings," all in aid of transforming knowledge to make it more women cen- 
tered. 
A nationwide feminist campaign to change the curriculum of the 
American academy to reflect the "new epistemologies" is being supported 
at the highest levels of the academy and government. There are now more 
than two hundred individual projects devoted to making the academy more 
congenial to "women's ways of knowing." The transformation projects are 
generously funded by the Ford Foundation and by federal agencies such as 
the Women's Education Equity Act Program and FIPSE, as well as by state 
governments from New Jersey to Tennessee to California-even Montana 
has one.% 
In a much-cited transformationist text entitled Women's Ways of 
Knowing, the authors distinguish between two kinds of knowing. "Separate 
knowing" is defined as "the game of impersonal reason," a game that has 
"belonged traditionally to boys." Male scholars specializing in their aca- 
demic disciplines (from chemist~y to philosophy) are known as "separate 
knowers": 
Separate knowers are tough-minded. They are like doormen at 
exclusive clubs. They don't want to let anything in unless they 
are pretty sure it is good. . . . Presented with a proposition, 
separate knowers immediately look for something wrong--a 
loophole, a factual error, a logical contradiction, the omission of 
contrary evidence-u 
Separate knowers play the "doubting game." The authors of Women's Ways 
of Knowing contrast separate knowing with a higher state they call "con- 
nected knowing." In place of the "doubthg game," connected knowers play 
the "believing game." This is more congenial for women because "many 
women find it easier to believe than to doubL'Q6 
The credulous transformationists do, however, resetve their skepticism 
for the "male-centered curriculum" they wish to replace. Catharine Mac- 
Kinnon has given extreme expression to feminist anger at being taken in by 
male ways of knowing and patriarchal comtructions of knowledge. Here she 
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is in Signs: "In the Bible, to know a woman is to have sex with her. You 
acquire carnal knowledge. . . . Feminists are beginning to understand that 
to know has meant to fc**"n (expletive deleted). 
Peggy McIntosh, one of the principal architects of the influential 
Wellesley Report on primary and secondary education, is more decorous in 
her choice of words.% But her views are not far from MacKinnon's, or 
from those of the New Jersey Project. She is known among feminist peda- 
gogues for her refinement of the distinction between "vertical and lateral 
thinking." McIntosh's "five phases of curricular consciousness" rest upon 
her own special variant of the "conneed knower" and "separate knower9' 
distinction. Vertical thinking is how the "white male elite" thinks. The 
dominant elite aim at "exact thinking, or decisiveness or mastery of some- 
thing, or being able to make an argument and take on all comers, or turn- 
ing in the perfect paper."a Vertical thinking is "triggered by words like 
excellence, accomplishment, success and achievement." Lateral thinking is 
more spiritual, "relational," and "inclusive." Women and people of color 
tend to be lateral thinkers. For "laterals," the "aim is not to win, but to be 
in a decent relationship with the invisible elements of the Dr. 
McIntosh is convinced that the current curriculum in the primary and 
secondary grades is dominated by vertical thinking. The Wellesley Report 
urges rooting out such "Anglo-European male values." For example, the 
report is down on debating clubs, which it sees as expressions of the 
emphasis on vertical thinking: "Debating clubs . . . take for granted the 
adversarial, winflose orientation. . . . The definition of the citizen in debate 
clubs . . . relates more to what psychologist Carol Gilligan names 'the ethos 
of justice' . . . rather than the 'ethos of care.' "31 
To me, as to Susan Haack, the assumption that "knowing*' and 
knowledge can be gendered is thoroughly alarming on social and political 
grounds. Just as alarming is the question of why a philosophical establish- 
ment that feels free to express its abhorrence of the Nazi idea of Jewish 
Science, should find itself so tongue-tied when it comes to feminist talk ~f 
"male science," "male ideas," and "male ways of knowing." 
My area of expertise is ethics, so I am happiiy leaving it to epistemol- 
ogists such as Ms. Haack to sort out and appraise the "new epistemol- 
ogies." For the moment, I defend not the strong thesis that feminist 
epistemology is completely wrongheaded, but the weaker thesis that the 
debate over its merits has hardly begun. In any case, it is much too soon 
for anyoneincluding the State of New Jersey-to begin "transforming the 
curriculum" to reflect the "new epistemologies." 
At the root of all transformation projects is the thesis that not just 
people but a h  ideas and disciplines are gendered. But, as the academic 
promoters of the politics of sexual identity are beginning to learn, gender is 
not sacrosanct as a principle of social and epistemic division. Why should 
identity politiss k stabilized at just two? A woman can be simultaneously a 
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victim, and, depending on her race and physical status, also a white, able- 
bodied oppressor of Latinas, black males, and the disabled. 
Today, white, able-bodied, heterosexual, feminist authors, awash in the 
new "politics of identity," are encouraged to confess to their privileged sta- 
tus right from the start. Here is a characteristic self-introduction by two 
feminist editors in their new book Feminism: 
'We' are Robyn and Diane; we speak as white middle-class 
heterosexual American feminist academics in our early thirties 
(to cover a number of the categories feminist criticism has lately 
been emphasizing as significant to one's reading and speaking 
position: race, class, sexual orientation, nationality, political 
positioning, education-level, and age1.32 
The middle-class, educated women who discovered the sexlgender system 
are now being forced to regard themselves as oppressors in a complex ecol- 
ogy of domination and subjugation. But perhaps "ecology" is too orderly a 
concept for a victimology that is spinning out of control. 
Feminist philosophy must itself be critiqued, and the radical pedagogi- 
cal programs it has inspired must be put on hold. The doctrine of the di- 
vided society and the thesis of gendered knowledge need to be squarely 
confronted and evaluated by philosophers prepared to brave the wrath of 
feminist academics with full awareness that their criticisms may well be 
taken as expressions of sexist backlash. 
I was speaking recently to a historian friend of mine about the femi- 
nist philosophers' attacks on rationality, and we both agreed that the nega- 
tive attitude toward reason was deplorable. "But don't be depressed," she 
said, "after all, most of human history has been dominated by ignorance, 
superstition, and irrationality. Why should we be any different?" 
But of course, as philosophers, we must do our utmost to be dif- 
ferent. I do find it depressing that philosophers are not loudly protesting 
the talk about vertical and lateral reasoning, about separate and connected 
knowing. It is dismaying that so few are challenging the philosophical 
premises of other pernicious doctrines that have already affected educa- 
tional practice and policy. That reason and reasonableness are rare is true 
enough. But defending an enclave of clarity and reason from the forces of 
unreason has been the point of doing philosophy from the very beginning. 
We are not morally free to hang back and allow unreason to have the last 
word. 
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